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This chapter explores the relative sidelining of psychoanalysis in critical approaches to Happiness 
Studies thus far. It argues that this stems from an American strand of psychoanalysis known as ego-
psychology which forms an unacknowledged element in the genealogy of Happiness Studies itself. 
However, the chapter focusses primarily on Jacques Lacan’s critical interventions into ego-psychology 
and his elaboration of a contrasting psychoanalytic theory and practice. It is claimed that Lacan’s 
criticisms of happiness as an ego-based therapeutic ideology, and his related suspicion of models of 
‘cure’, constitute a crucial resource for critical approaches to Happiness Studies. Finally, it is argued 
that, to this end, psychoanalysis is best approached as a clinical practice involving a tact with the 
subjective demand for happiness, rather than as a social or cultural theory that supports a generalised 
critique of happiness as a neoliberal ideology but misses, thereby, the affective hold over intimacy and 
sociality contemporary happiness has. 
Psychoanalysis: Friend or Foe to Critical Happiness Studies? 
Although there are now numerous critiques of the social, political and economic agendas behind the 
field of Happiness Studies and its allied discourses of ‘resilience’ and ‘well-being’ (Davies: 2015, 
Binkley: 2014, Evans and Reid: 2014, Berlant: 2011, Ahmed: 2010; Bruckner: 2010, Ehrenreich: 2010; 
Whippman: 2016; Wright: 2013 etc.), there has as yet been insufficient reflection on the theoretical 
frameworks that might found an opposing discipline of critical happiness studies. This chapter argues 
that while a number of approaches have been utilised effectively in recent interrogations of happiness 
- from Feminist cultural studies to critical phenomenology; from Foucauldian biopolitics to discourse 
analysis; from cultural history to the sociology of health and of work; and from critical psychology and 
psychiatry to theories of affect inspired by continental philosophy - one resource has been notable for 
its relative absence: psychoanalysis, as a body of theory but particularly as a clinical practice.  
On the one hand, this seems very surprising. Psychoanalysis offers one of the richest and most flexible 
conceptual frameworks available for engaging with the question of human happiness and its obdurate 
opposite; one that has, moreover, played a central part in the Frankfurt School tradition of ‘Freudo-
Marxist’ critical theory (Held: 1980; Wolfenstein: 1993). Furthermore, the rejection of psychoanalysis 
is a gesture constitutive of the fields of positive psychology and Happiness Studies themselves. Figures 
like Martin Seligman regularly claim that Freud’s big mistake was focussing on pathological suffering 
rather than on potential self-improvement, rendering psychoanalysis in his eyes nothing less than a 
“rotten-to-the-core doctrine” (Seligman: 2013, p. xii). Though never as dismissive as this, the critics of 
Happiness Studies have often found themselves in counter-intuitive agreement that psychoanalysis is 
somehow part of the problem. Thinkers such as Eva Illouz date the rise of what she calls ‘emotional 
capitalism’ from 1909, “the year Sigmund Freud went to lecture in America at Clark University” (Illouz: 
2007, p.5); while others, such as Sam Binkley, follow Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari in locating 
psychoanalysis squarely within the governmental apparatus of the Oedipalising ‘psy’ disciplines 
(Binkley: 2014). 
Yet on the other hand, this sidelining of psychoanalysis as a critical framework is not surprising at all, 
because Illouz and Binkley are right: an utterly diluted version of ‘Freudianism’ has indeed been co-
opted by the very ‘therapy industry’ (Moloney: 2013) that now sustains the discourse of happiness, 
even as it seems predicated, paradoxically, on a rejection of Freud. This pertains to the knotty history 
of psychoanalysis in America specifically, which there is no hope of disentangling much here (although 
see Hale: 1971; Makari: 2008; and Burnham: 2012). Nonetheless, it is thanks in part to what might be 
called ‘Freud lite’, promulgated in the United States since the early 20th Century, that a neoliberal 
conception of happiness is now experienced as a new sensus communis in the 21st.  
However, this entanglement of psychoanalytic ideas with the globalisation of the American pursuit of 
Happiness does not call for the wholesale abandonment of Freud’s invention. On the contrary, it 
necessitates a careful parsing out of psychoanalysis ‘proper’ from its problematic deviation. Despite 
the often ossified psychoanalytic theory to be found mainly in the Arts and Humanities Faculties of 
many universities today, I would argue that the clinical practice of psychoanalysis represents an 
ongoing engagement with happiness too valuable to be ignored by this new field. The consulting room 
is also a site of knowledge-production, albeit an overlooked and peculiar one, in which the ‘knowledge’ 
produced does not lend itself to “university discourse” (Lacan: 2008).1 My own experience as a 
psychoanalyst suggests the importance of a tactful pragmatics with the subjective demand for 
happiness, rather than the relative ease of an academic dismissal of it as a neoliberal ‘ideology’ (true 
though that undoubtedly is).  
Luckily, much of the work needed for this parsing out has already been undertaken by the French 
psychoanalyst, Jacques Lacan, as long ago as the 1950s and 1960s. His polemics regarding the 
adaptationist tendencies of what he called the “other psychoanalysis” (Lacan: 2006a), which pertained 
primarily to an American variant called ‘ego psychology’ (see Bergman: 2000 and Hale: 1995), echo 
our positivity-preoccupied present and we can learn a great deal from re-visiting them. Lacan foresaw 
the transformation of happiness into a therapeutic ideology (Lacan: 2007), and his distancing of 
psychoanalysis from the psychiatric and medicalised notion of ‘cure’, central to the therapeutic culture 
in which ‘flourishing’ now flourishes, arguably redeems psychoanalysis as a theoretical resource for 
critical happiness studies.  
It is therefore towards Lacan’s complication of the ‘happy cure’, and his related reflections on endings 
of analysis other than straightforwardly happy ones, that this chapter will ultimately make its way. 
Baby and Bathwater: The Psychologization of Psychoanalysis 
First, however, a brief review of some exemplary critical texts on Happiness Studies will illustrate the 
relative sidelining of psychoanalysis to which I have referred. In so doing, I certainly do not want to 
suggest that psychoanalysis is a panacea: Freud himself was insistent that it should not be a 
Weltanshaaung or overarching world-view (Freud: 1963). Evidently, psychoanalysis does not hold all 
the answers and critical happiness studies must continue to draw on an inter-disciplinary array of 
theoretical frameworks and research methodologies to triangulate its protean object of study. Yet I 
do want to argue that psychoanalysis, especially clinical psychoanalysis, should claim a more 
prominent place among them if the politics of the (un)happy subject are to be more adequately 
theorised. 
Progress has certainly been made in the appraisal of the happiness agenda. Its intimate overlaps with 
neoliberalism have been outlined in a number of publications now. For example, William Davies’ 
excellent The Happiness Industry: How the Government and Big Business Sold Us Well-Being (Davies: 
2015) offers a critical history of the ‘happy’ present. It situates the emergence of Happiness Studies in 
relation to the common denominator between Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism and Gustav Fechner’s 
mathematical ‘psycho-physics’ in the 19th Century: namely, the numerical measurement and 
comparison of administered pleasures and satisfactions. Davies shows how experimental behavioural 
                                                          
1 Briefly, university discourse is defined by Lacan as a form of the social link that situates knowledge, often technical, 
disembodied knowledge, in the place of mastery once occupied by more vertical modes of traditional authority. 
psychology, an affective style of management within the corporate sphere, and a behavioural 
economics increasingly decoupled from the welfare state, each attempted to actualise the statistical 
capture of affect that Bentham had only imagined with his ‘felicific calculus’.  
However, in this otherwise comprehensive account of contemporary happiness, psychoanalysis barely 
features at all. It appears primarily as what is excluded by mainstream psychiatry in the process of 
medicalizing depression with the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (p.164); or as what a figure like the 
psychosociologist Jacob Moreno was reacting against in his development of so-called ‘sociometrics’ 
(Davies: 2015, p. 199). But this is true only in relation to a caricature of psychoanalysis which needs to 
be seen in context if the proverbial ‘baby and bathwater’ problem is to be avoided. Indeed, the 
presence of psychoanalysis only within a descriptive narrative of its rejection is a motif one can also 
find in the very Happiness Studies texts Davies is so critical of. To give just one example, in Jonathan 
Haidt’s The Happiness Hypothesis: Putting Ancient Wisdom and Philosophy to the Test of Modern 
Science (2006), Freud and psychoanalysis are present primarily as what Aaron Beck contradicted when 
he created cognitive therapy (Haidt: 2006, p.37); as a theory of rigid developmental determinism that 
had to be overcome to arrive at the apparently universal ‘happiness formula’ (p.91); and as what had 
to be refuted so that psychologists Harry Harlow and John Bowlby could “humanize the treatment of 
children” (p.109). 
Something similar happens in Sam Binkley’s equally excellent book, Happiness as Enterprise: An Essay 
on Neoliberal Life (2014). Binkley is convincing in his advocacy of the relevance of a Foucauldian 
framework for the analysis of the rise of institutionalised positive psychology. Foucault helps us to see 
the latter as an apparatus of neoliberal individuation functioning across diverse domains such as 
health, education and the military. Drawing on Foucault’s Collège de France lectures on The Birth of 
Biopolitics, Binkley demonstrates that happiness has become “a purely plastic attribute of a 
psychosomatic self” (p.2), one modelled on the entrepreneur who continually undertakes cost-benefit 
analyses of affective as well as monetary transactions. This approach arguably builds on the work of 
Nikolas Rose exploring the rise of the psychological self as a mode of, and target for, biopolitical 
governmentality (Rose: 1998; 2007). Indeed, I myself have argued for the pertinence of the concept 
of biopolitics for understanding contemporary happiness in a special issue of Health, Culture & Society 
(Wright: 2013).  
However, as I also suggested there, this Foucauldian framework is helpful descriptively and 
analytically, but not necessarily critically or in relation to the crucial question of subjectivity. I would 
argue that psychoanalysis is much better attuned to this issue. Yet in Happiness as Enterprise, 
psychoanalysis almost always appears next to a minus sign: it is what was rejected by Rogerian 
humanistic psychology (p.131); it is an integral element of what Foucault called the ‘psy-function’ 
(p.137); it is an Oedipalizing technology of the self (p.139); it is perfectly compatible with the industrial 
psychology pioneered by Elton Mayo (p.140); and it is a normative framework that reinforces the 
institution of the family and marriage through counselling and then family systems theory (p.144). In 
such arguments, Binkley is of course faithful to Foucault’s trenchant critique of psychoanalysis as an 
aspect of disciplinary and then biopolitical power (Foucault: 1998; 2003). And yet, seen as a critique 
of institutionalised forms of precisely what Lacan called “the other psychoanalysis”, Foucault’s 
argument need not be taken as a dismissal of psychoanalysis tout court and can even compliment 
Lacan’s critique.  
What both of these motifs – the inclusion of psychoanalysis only within the narrative of its exclusion, 
and that of its containment without remainder within the ‘psy-function’ – arguably have in common 
is a rapid conflation of psychoanalysis and psychology. In the clinical field this is enabled by the 
ambiguity introduced with the term ‘psychotherapy’, which in practice covers a vast range of eclectic 
approaches almost all of which are decidedly non- or even anti-psychoanalytic (see Loewenthal: 2015 
and Parker: 2015). The effects of this are noticeable in Eva Illouz’s otherwise perceptive arguments in 
Cold Intimacies: The Making of Emotional Capitalism (2007). Although not focussed specifically on 
happiness, this illuminating text is a crucial reference point for a discipline of critical happiness studies, 
as indicated by her welcome participation in this volume. Drawing on a sociological tradition very 
much informed by Frankfurt School critical theory, Illouz demonstrates the ways in which the 
management of emotions became, from the early 20th Century onwards, a central concern in the 
workplace and in the home, resulting in a blurring between these realms. This commodification of 
emotion extends into the very pores of supposedly intimate, affective life. She shows this in the sphere 
of love, through an analysis of online dating sites where one can discern the imposition of normative 
social scripts regarding emotional exchanges ultimately figured as ‘profitable’ in some sense.2 Illouz is 
absolutely right to identify experimental psychology and its emphasis on statistical measurement and 
the management of affect as the catalyst behind these developments; but in so doing, she is perhaps 
a little too quick to absorb psychoanalysis into this narrative, to conflate Freud with a perceived 
‘Freudianism’.  
But I would argue that, again, a slight shift in perspective can reframe Illouz’s analysis in Cold Intimacies 
as a much-needed critique of the psychologization of psychoanalysis in the United States, without at 
all accepting that this very real and powerful process exhausts what psychoanalysis ‘is’. Just as 
Foucault’s view of psychoanalysis can be illuminating if framed as a critique of the ‘other 
psychoanalysis’ rather than of psychoanalysis as a whole, so Illouz’s analysis of the rise of ‘emotional 
capitalism’ can be extremely relevant if contextualised in relation both to the vast distance between 
mainstream clinical psychology and psychoanalysis (see Parker: 2015), and to the history of 
psychoanalysis in America which has arguably minimised this distance to the point of attempting to 
erase it (Hale: 1971; Hale: 1995; Burnham: 2012). 
It is no surprise that the ‘can do’ attitude and down-to-earth pragmatism of American culture should 
have given birth to positive psychology and Happiness Studies. What is surprising is that such a culture 
could have previously welcomed the deeply European pessimism of psychoanalysis with open arms. 
Arguably however, psychoanalysis State-side was from the beginning a less than faithful 
psychologization of Freud’s ideas, and it was essentially this development to which Jacques Lacan 
objected so vehemently in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Contesting the ‘Other Psychoanalysis’ 
Lacan famously declared the need for a “return to Freud” in his Rome Discourse of 1953 (Lacan: 
2006b). This clarion call was motivated by an intense dislike - not uncontaminated by a European 
cultural prejudice he shared with Freud himself (see Falzeder: 2014) - for the ‘neo-Freudian’ wave that 
emerged in America in the 1940s, but began to exert considerable influence within the International 
Psychoanalytic Association and well-beyond in the 1950s. 
Over that period, Lacan had observed American (or naturalised American) psychoanalysts such as Erik 
Erikson, Karen Horney, Harry Stack Sullivan, and Clara Thompson, openly rejecting Freud’s drive theory 
and thus the centrality of psychosexual conflict in psychoanalytic theory (Hale: 1995). In so doing, they 
paved the way for a much greater focus on the socio-cultural factors involved in ego-formation, and 
thus on developmental psychology and attendant notions of ‘maturity’, ‘adaptation’ and even 
‘normality’, rather than the unconscious per se. Despite many differences between them, these ‘neo-
                                                          
2 Illouz has since developed this argument further (see Illouz: 2013), effectively pitting sociology against psychoanalysis, or 
at least a certain version of it, as an explanatory framework for difficulties in love.  
Freudians’ broadly came to advocate a therapeutic approach based on strengthening the ego and even 
identifying with the strong or ‘healthy’ ego of the analyst. This evolved into a specific orientation of 
American psychoanalysis called ‘ego-psychology’ which is associated primarily with another émigré 
analyst, Heinz Hartman (see Bergman: 2000), but also - not insignificantly - with Lacan’s own analyst, 
Rudolph Loewenstein. Based on Freud’s metapsychological writings and what we know of his own 
clinical technique however, we can say with some confidence that these ‘neo-Freudians’ were in fact 
‘anti-Freudians’ in all but name. Nowhere was this more apparent than in their insistence on a ‘mature’ 
and ‘conflict-free’ ego as a desirable therapeutic goal. As we will see in a moment, the conflict-free 
ego is an out-and-out oxymoron for Lacan. Nonetheless, the notion of an ego-based ‘cure’ made sense 
in an American cultural context in which ‘self-esteem’ had started to be conceived, within a much 
broader self-help movement, as a kind of psychological capital (Cruickshank: 1993; Rimke: 2000). Until 
its declining influence in the 1970s with the rise of cognitivism, ego-psychology effectively presented 
itself as the pre-eminent psychotherapeutic framework with which to facilitate the constitutional right 
to the pursuit of a happy ego… 
This cluster of concepts, clinical practices, analysts and analytical institutions then, is what Lacan 
gathers under the pejorative heading of “the other psychoanalysis”. He was not alone in recognising 
its dangers however. Around the same time, Herbert Marcuse developed his own critique of this 
“revisionist school” in Eros and Civilization (Marcuse: 1987), centring his discussion on the question, 
precisely, of happiness-as-cure. Marcuse noted that whereas Freud identified the structural 
impossibility of happiness in conditions of modernity in Civilization and its Discontents – limiting the 
clinical ambitions of psychoanalysis to the attainment of that “ordinary unhappiness” referred to as 
long ago as Studies on Hysteria of 1895 - the so-called neo-Freudians had begun to “proclaim a higher 
goal of therapy”, nothing less than “an ‘optimal development of a person’s potentialities and the 
realization of his individuality’” (Marcuse: 1987, p.258). This should sound very familiar to readers of 
positive psychology and the Happiness Studies literature today, so much so that neo-Freudianism can 
be seen as part of their shared yet disavowed genealogy. There are vast differences of course, 
particularly the positivism of positive psychology that lays such stress on measurement, but at the 
level of the higher goal Marcuse mentions,3 we can certainly speak of a close ‘family resemblance’. 
Would this not cast new light on the almost symptomatic nature of the repeated rejection of 
psychoanalysis by happiness gurus such Seligman and Haidt?  
To my knowledge, there is little to no scholarship on this subterranean connection between today’s 
positive psychologists and the neo-Freudian wave of American ego-psychologists. Any doubt, 
however, could probably be dispelled by reference to the work and considerable influence of yet 
another émigré American psychoanalyst, Heinz Kohut (see Strozier: 2001). Not long after his forced 
migration from Vienna to Chicago during World War Two, Kohut began to develop what he called a 
‘Self Psychology’, the central postulate of which was a ‘healthy narcissism’ (Kohut: 1985). In stark 
contrast to Freud’s own position on narcissism in 1914 (Freud: 1957), Kohut conceptualised this 
‘healthy narcissism’ as a kind of psychic fuel powering ambition and self-realisation, even as a “bank 
account of self-esteem” (Lunbeck: 2014, p.219) on which to draw during trying times. Does this not 
sound like both flourishing and resilience avant la lettre? And does not the bank account metaphor 
translate Freud’s quintessentially 19th Century thermodynamic understanding of ‘economics’ into a 
very different 20th Century financial register? Thanks partly to his powerful position as president of 
the American Psychoanalytic Association, by the 1970s Kohut’s ‘Self Psychology’ seemed to have 
absorbed the author of The Interpretation of Dreams into the American dream. One is inclined to look 
                                                          
3 Marcuse’s critique of the neo-Freudians is remarkably perceptive but also problematic in its own ways. Rather like 
Adorno, he much prefers psychoanalytic theory to its clinical application, viewing the latter as intrinsically normative. 
back on Freud’s alleged comment to Jung as they approached the American coast back in 1909 – “They 
do not know that we are bringing them the plague!” – and wonder who, in fact, was unaware of where 
‘the plague’ really lay in wait … 
That, in any case, would be Lacan’s polemical position, which he developed in a number of texts and 
seminars over twenty odd years. Here, I will restrict myself to a few comments on just four references: 
his 1958 text ‘The Direction of the Treatment’ (Lacan: 2006a); his seventh seminar on The Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis from 1959-60 (Lacan: 2007); the series of lectures he gave in 1967 which have been 
gathered together as My Teaching (Lacan: 2008b); and finally, his gnomic observations on the 
differences between psychotherapy and psychoanalysis in the televised interview from 1973, entitled, 
simply Télévision (Lacan: 1990).  
From the Imaginary to the Symbolic, and Away from Happy Endings 
Lacan’s ‘Direction of the Treatment’ is a classic combination of acerbic wit, iconoclasm, and conceptual 
innovation, but his overall aim is ostensibly to intervene into the-then dominance of the ego-
psychologists. Via ‘strong readings’ of Freudian texts but also through his own idiosyncratic 
deployment of structural linguistics, Lacan criticises the assumptions of the ego-psychologists at the 
same time as elaborating a contrasting theoretical and clinical framework.  
The first key difference is that, in keeping with the famous ‘mirror-stage’ paper (Lacan: 2006c), Lacan 
understands the ego as structurally alienated in an external Other: the ego is not there from the 
beginning as a locus of adaptation but only emerges in and through a dialectical relation to an Other. 
It is not that this alienation befalls the ego as a kind of tragic accident, but rather that the ego is this 
alienation. This makes any notion of egoic harmony as a model of happy ‘cure’ completely wrong-
headed from the start. For Lacan, the ego is entirely imaginary. This is not to say that it doesn’t exist - 
far from it - but rather that the mode of existence it has is inescapably entangled with the demands 
of this external Other, which is often a conduit for social values around everything from sexuality, to 
love relations, to what counts as ‘productive’ or ‘worthwhile’ work … in other words, for normative 
understandings of happiness. From this perspective, the self of Kohut’s ‘Self Psychology’ would be the 
result not of ‘healthy narcissism’, but of a narcissism marked by a constitutive misrecognition that 
renders the ego vulnerable to rivalry, aggression and exhaustion. The ego then is a non-identity that 
uses consoling fantasies, individual as well as social, to pretend that it is in fact an autonomous, non-
alienated identity. One can quickly see how the ‘promise of happiness’ (Ahmed: 2010) comes in at this 
imaginary level in order to prop up imagos of wholeness, plenitude and the happiness-to-come of 
complete satisfaction; yet simultaneously, one can also see how such an inherently false promise of 
happiness leads to an even deeper alienation in the Other’s demands. This would bring us back to the 
dialectic of repression and sublimation Freud identified in Civilization and its Discontents as a deadlock 
for modern happiness. 
From Lacan’s perspective therefore, prescribing a strengthening of the ego to ‘cure’ neuroses is like 
to trying to put a fire out with petrol: it is a recipe for frustration, acting out, or even a serious passage 
à l’acte on the patient’s part. Hence his question: “How can the ego, whose aid they [these ‘other 
psychoanalysts’] claim to enlist here, not suffer, in effect, from the blows of further alienation they 
induce in the subject?” (2006a, p.534). This is because the ego is constitutively blind to the subject’s 
unconscious desire, which is what is ‘speaking’ in a roundabout way in the neurotic symptom. This 
relates to the fundamental conceptual opposition organising the argument in ‘Direction of the 
Treatment’, and indeed much of Lacan’s work in the 1950s, namely, that between the imaginary and 
the symbolic. If the ego is imaginary, the unconscious is symbolic - structured, as he famously put it, 
like a language. That the ego and the subject are two distinct entities, that, in other words, the un-
conscious exists, is a fundamental hypothesis of psychoanalytic theory. Yet it is precisely this that is 
set aside by the neo-Freudians when they formulate concepts such as the ‘total personality’ or a 
putative ‘non-conflictual sphere’. 
For Lacan then, directing the treatment would consist in handling the transference so that the neurotic 
patient can move beyond the ego’s imaginary demand for happiness and towards the unconscious 
desire that really animates them as a speaking subject. This is not at all a matter of telling the patient 
they are wrong to imagine some possible happiness in life, to educate them in the tragic nature of 
human existence, or indeed to point out that happiness is a mirage of neoliberal ideology. It is hard to 
imagine this being of any use to the patient! Such sermonising would rest upon a position of assumed 
knowledge, of a pre-existing and very universal type, which the analyst should resist if she is to truly 
listen to the patient’s speech, where a very different kind of knowledge can emerge. Rather, it is a 
matter of giving some space – and, crucially, some words - to the frustration implicit in the demand 
for happiness. Why would one be demanding happiness, after all, if one already had it? Demanding 
happiness already implies unhappiness, but addressing it to an analyst who knows how to work with 
the transference can enable the initial complaint to crystallize into a subjectively assumed question 
which has no ready-to-hand answer in off-the-shelf tropes of happiness. This question can then propel 
the analytic work away from imaginary fantasies and towards unconscious, symbolic desire. The 
direction of the treatment, then, involves the transformative tact with happiness to which I referred 
in my opening remarks.  
These may seem like narrow issues of clinical technique, but Lacan never stops underlining the broader 
ethical and political consequences intrinsic to the ‘other psychoanalysis’. For example, he discerns 
very clearly the link between ego-psychology and the exercise of a certain kind of power and authority. 
Its theoretical framework implies an insight into the nature of reality on the analyst’s part that the 
patient needs to learn from. Therapy can then be modelled along didactic lines as a kind of re-
education, with the analyst teaching the patient about what reality is: “They gauge the patient’s 
defection from it [this reality] using the authoritarian principle which has been used by educators since 
time immemorial” (p.493), namely, that their own teachers taught them about this reality, so it must 
be true. Imagining a ‘good’ therapeutic outcome as ‘identification with’ or ‘introjection of’ the ‘healthy 
part of the analyst’s ego’ stems from this same assumption of superior insight into reality. And yet, for 
Lacan reality is itself an imaginary category: our experience of reality, he argues, is constructed using 
fantasy co-ordinates of what the ego would like to be in the eyes of the Other. This self-centred take 
on ‘reality’ is a common enough condition of course, but it becomes a serious ethical problem in an 
analyst who ends up imposing it onto the patient, especially when this imposition is raised to an 
analytic principle by a whole training school. Lacan does not pull any punches in targeting what he 
perceives to be the truly narcissistic self-authorisation at work in the schools of ego-psychology across 
the pond: 
A team of egos [in English] […] offers itself to Americans to guide them towards happiness [in 
English], without upsetting the autonomies, whether egoistic or not, that pave with their 
nonconflictual spheres the American [in English] way of getting there (2006a, p.494). 
The use of English in the original French text here indicates the perceived effects on psychoanalytic 
theory of an Anglophone cultural as well as philosophical (empiricist, pragmatist) context. This could 
certainly be read as European snobbery on Lacan’s part and it would be hard to deny that something 
of the sort is at play, yet he does takes the time to detail the consequences of the distortions of 
Freudian doctrine of which he believes ego-psychology to be guilty. 
From his insistence that ‘reality’ is an imaginary lure, it follows that the pseudo-Darwinian notion of 
adaptation to reality, by which Freud himself was arguably tempted at times, should have no place in 
psychoanalytic theory or practice. On the contrary, Lacan says that the ego is “only too well adapted 
to [this reality]” (p.498), meaning that it is already thoroughly alienated in the imaginary. In analysis, 
it is vitally important that “what is at stake is something altogether different than the relations 
between the ego and the world” (p.499). Moreover, because the notion of adaptation lends itself to 
the explanatory frameworks that define developmental psychology, Lacan is also critical of the 
‘geneticism’ common in the ‘other psychoanalysis’. Geneticism refers to the latter’s tendency to 
appeal to developmental stages in offering causal explanations of psychopathologies, as if Freud’s 
psychosexual phases (oral, anal, phallic etc.) could be reduced to the more or less successful unfolding 
of an organism’s nature. Notwithstanding the scientific credibility gained from this supposed overlap, 
psychoanalytic ‘geneticism’ has ultimately been very damaging. Lacan does not discuss it, but an 
illustrative example would be Bruno Bettelheim’s incautious postulation of ‘refrigerator mothers’ in 
the pathogenesis of autism, as if ‘bad parenting’ at a crucial developmental stage were the underlying 
problem. As well as crude ‘mother blaming’ with dreadful consequences for parents caught up in this 
discourse, this has the even more pernicious effect of denying the autistic child any subjectivity of 
their own.4 In ‘Direction of the Treatment’, Lacan expresses his disappointment that this intersection 
between ‘geneticism’ and developmental psychology has not led to a “fruitful critique of the relations 
between development and the obviously more complex structures Freud introduced” (p. 504). 
Elsewhere, he draws on these ‘more complex structures’ to develop a recursive model of psychic 
causality, combating thereby the simplistic model inherent to the developmental perspective (Lacan: 
2006d). 
Each of these interventions go a long way toward disentangling psychoanalysis from the happy ego 
conceived within American ego-psychology. However, it is also noticeable in ‘Direction of the 
Treatment’ that on the specific issue of happiness, Lacan retains a rather nuanced position: 
[P]eople imagine that a psychoanalyst should be a happy man. Indeed, is it not happiness that 
people ask him for, and how could he give it, commonsense asks, if he does not have a bit of it 
himself? 
It is a fact that we do not proclaim our incompetence to promise happiness in an era in which the 
question of how to gauge it has become so complicated – in the first place, because happiness, as 
Saint-Just said, has become a political factor (2006a, p.513) 
Imaginary though it might be, it seems the analyst would be unwise to dismiss the question of 
(un)happiness that leads someone to seek analysis in the first place: it is this nuanced pragmatism 
with the demand for happiness which I believe offers useful lessons for critical happiness studies. 
Furor Sanandi: The Cure Sickness 
A related lesson can be drawn from Lacan’s careful separation of psychoanalytic practice from 
dominant paradigms of medical cure. As health is increasingly framed in terms of economic 
productivity, risk assessment and something akin to customer satisfaction today, this positioning 
becomes more and more important (Polzer and Power: 2016).  
The question of what a psychoanalytic ‘cure’ is has long been a pressing one. During a debate about 
the requirements of a psychoanalytic training sparked by American analysts who insisted that a full 
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the other way, identifying and supporting what of a subject is already there precisely where other orientations would see 
only the ‘disorder’. See Maleval: 2009. 
medical degree ought be a precondition, Freud argued in ‘Questions of Lay Analysis’ that 
psychoanalysis must not belong solely in the hands of the medical sciences: he stressed instead the 
value of a broad knowledge of the Arts and Humanities, including literature and the visual and plastic 
arts (Freud: 2001). At stake in this debate was the disease-model of cure which enjoyed the scientific 
credibility of the biological and health sciences, but was totally inadequate for conceptualising the 
psyche. It is clear from his recommendation of a literary training for the would-be analyst that, in a 
very ‘Lacanian’ way, Freud considered the psyche in symbolic rather than organic terms: the 
psychoanalytic symptom is not like a virus one can catch, and cure, if such there is, is not like a 
vaccination. In several late papers on technique, Freud insisted that in the same way that there is a 
‘navel’ of a dream that permanently resists interpretation, so the psychoanalytic ‘cure’ encounters an 
ineradicable limit in what he called the “bedrock of castration” (Freud: 2001b). Castration cannot be 
cured. Indeed, Freud warned of the dangers of the opposite assertion, terming it a furor sanandi, a 
kind of fury or rage to heal which can stymy analytic work. Now that in the era of quick-fix Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy, ‘cure’ often means little more than getting back into the workforce, Freud’s 
warnings about furor sanandi take on a decidedly political relevance. This is brilliantly captured in the 
title of Cederström and Spicer’s book, The Wellness Syndrome (2015), and should be contextualised in 
relation to neoliberalism and the health effects of austerity politics (Shrecker and Bambra: 2015).  
Lacan’s own work echoes these Freudian debates. The original French title of ‘Direction of the 
Treatment’ is actually ‘La Direction de la cure’, and the broader psychoanalytic literature in French 
tends to use this term, whereas, for reasons which warrant further investigation, English texts 
generally use ‘treatment’. A year or so after ‘La Direction de la cure’ was published however, Lacan 
took up again the problematic overlap between the notion of cure and prevailing ideas of happiness 
in his seventh seminar, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (Lacan: 2007). This rich reflection on Aristotle, the 
Stoic tradition, Antigone but also the Marquis de Sade, Kant and Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism, is 
centred on the classical question of the good and its relation to pleasure, making it an extremely 
relevant source for critical approaches to happiness.  
We find there the same reference to Saint-Just’s quip mentioned above, but Lacan provides a deeper 
historical context which links the modern demand for happiness to the radical egalitarianism of the 
French Revolution. At the height of the Ancien Régime, feudal subservience, monarchical absolutism 
and the church’s theological justification for deferring bliss until the hereafter, combined to prevent 
worldly happiness becoming an existential question as such. The revolution in which Saint-Just 
participated changed all that, but not without ambivalent consequences. For example, Lacan seems 
to see Benthamite utilitarianism as a nullifying response to the revolutionary dimensions of the 
demand for happiness, transforming the latter into the top-down administration of aggregated 
pleasures organised around a notional average (the famous ‘greatest good for the greatest number’). 
Some see Happiness Studies as an updated utilitarianism (Veenhoven: 2010), and the role of 
Happiness and Wellbeing indexes in health and social policy supports this (Bok: 2010). It is already for 
these reasons that Lacan, in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, calls happiness a “bourgeois ideology” 
(Lacan: 2007, p.359) which analysts must have nothing whatsoever to do with.  
Towards the end of the 1960s, Lacan is making similar points but with a renewed awareness, post-
Kinsey report and the Sexual Revolution, that the notion of the happy cure has been sexualised, 
paradoxically through a truly perverted reading of Freud. In My Teaching, a text which brings together 
three lectures delivered during 1967 - the year of the ‘summer of Love’ that preceded the outburst of 
‘revolutionary’ desire in May ’68 - he attacks what I have already called ‘Freud lite’:  
Sexuality is something much more public. In truth, I do not think that psychoanalysis had much to 
do with that. Well, let’s argue that if psychoanalysis did have something to do with that, and that 
is precisely what I am saying, then this is not really psychoanalysis (Lacan: 2008b, p.18).  
He follows this attempt to distance psychoanalysis from what is being done in its name with a series 
of puns which only work in French. He begins by arguing that “Sa vie sexuelle”, his or her sexual life - 
the centrepiece of a certain counter-cultural inflection of the other psychoanalysis - should be written 
“using a special orthography” so that it reads “ça vice exuelle”, ‘this sexual vice’. Although more or 
less homophonous, this foregrounds the deeply unfashionable idea that there is some link between 
sexuality and vice. However, it is crucial that we do not imagine Lacan is here being a reactionary and 
calling for a return to Victorian morality. On the contrary, the vice referred to has nothing to do with 
the act of sex itself, but rather with appealing to the image of sex and sexuality as a new version of 
the ‘happy cure’, a new realm of non-conflictual harmony and non-repressive expression. Lacan is not 
convinced by the equation of ‘free love’ with the supposedly untrammelled ‘joy of sex’, and thus 
unimpressed by the model of cure tailored around such ideas:  
[Y]ou have to ask yourself if the ideal end of the psychoanalytic cure really is to get some 
gentlemen to earn a bit more money than before and, when it comes to his sex life, to supplement 
the moderate help he asks from his conjugal partner with the help he gets from his secretary 
(Lacan: 2008b, p.20).  
Still targeting the ego psychologists, he directly addresses Franz Alexander of the Chicago School, 
noting the huge effort of theoretical revisionism it took him to “inaugurate this extravagant 
therapeutic fashion” (p.21) which promises that “when the ego is strong and at peace, when the 
obsession with tits and bums has signed its little peace treaty with the superego […] everything is fine” 
(p.20). This notion of psychoanalytic cure as sexual healing is in total contrast to Lacan’s assertion that 
“sexuality makes a hole in truth” (p.21), meaning, among other things, that the real of sex is akin to 
Freud’s ‘bedrock of castration’. This is what the last in the series of puns in this talk is getting at: 
following the logic of the signifier, Lacan gets to the more or less nonsensical “ça visse sexuelle” (p.18) 
which might be rendered as “it screws”. Screwing doesn’t fill a hole or compensate for a lack, but 
makes a hole, a real, which everybody has to find a singular way of dealing with.  
By the 1973 interview transcribed as Télévision, Lacan is even more circumspect about the notion of 
cure, primarily because it has become entangled in psychotherapeutic ideas which are in turn 
contaminated by the American pursuit of happiness. Once again, he does not dismiss the notion of 
cure but he is careful with it: “The cure” he argues “is a demand that originates in the voice of the 
sufferer, of someone who suffers from his body or his thought” (Lacan: 1990, p.7). As in ‘Direction of 
the Treatment’, this situates the cure not in a disease-model but in the patient’s demand, as a means 
of articulating his or her suffering. To push this novel understanding of cure further, Lacan then reflects 
on the differences between psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. This has become important precisely 
because “[t]hese days there is no psychotherapy that is not expected to be ‘psychoanalytically 
inspired’” (ibid.). He refuses the usual lazy differentiator, namely the use of the couch in 
psychoanalysis and its absence in psychotherapy. Since a bit of furniture does not seem to offer a 
robust criterion, he makes a deeper distinction pertaining to two different understandings of 
language.  
Psychotherapy, Lacan argues, emphasises the side of language that facilitates meaning and what we 
imagine to be transparent ‘inter-subjective communication’. After the Sexual Revolution and in the 
wake of a certain reading of Freud which Lacan terms “sexo-leftism” (p.31), sex has become a kind of 
transcendental meaning, the meaning behind all others, so that a pseudo-Freudian mode of 
psychotherapy “pours out a flood of meaning to float the sexual boat” (p.8). And yet this focus on 
meaning is ultimately an imaginary phenomenon: “not that it doesn’t do some good, but it’s a good 
that’s a return to what’s worse” (ibid.). By contrast, psychoanalysis emphasises that “meaning [..] acts 
as speech’s screen” (ibid.), which is to say that it is where meaning fails, in slips of the tongue or 
dreams or symptoms, that the screen of meaning falls and the unconscious is seen or heard to speak. 
Faithful to Saussure then, Lacan argues that “to the side of meaning the study of language opposes 
the side of the sign” (ibid.). Rooted in clinical practice and thus speech, psychoanalysis offers not the 
cure for a disease per se, but an exit from the interminable imaginary labyrinth of happiness as the 
false promise of both a final meaning and of the sexualised commodity’s illusory claim - ‘satisfaction 
guaranteed’. 
Conclusion: The Politics of the Subject and the Symptom 
At the beginning of this chapter I pointed out that critical approaches to Happiness Studies have 
tended to reduce psychoanalysis either to a narrative of its exclusion in the rise of positive psychology, 
or to a central component of the ‘psy’ disciplines that specialise in a neoliberal form of individuation. 
However, by demonstrating that clinical psychoanalysis, and the theory arising from it, is in fact 
reducible to neither of these roles, I have made the case for the pertinence of psychoanalytic 
perspectives, especially Lacanian ones, for this emerging field of critical happiness studies. Allow me, 
in closing, to briefly enumerate some of the potential gains of utilising psychoanalysis as a critical 
theoretical framework. 
Firstly, in revisiting the complex schisms within the international psychoanalytic movement, one gets 
a sense of the stakes in the commodification of Freud’s ideas. Simplifying enormously, it is possible to 
discern two potential models of the subject. On the one hand, the truly Freudian subject which, far 
from coinciding with the socialised ego, constitutes a kind of singular excess, a remainder left outside 
of ‘discourse’ understood in a Foucaultian manner. On the other hand, we can perceive a subject that 
is essentially identical with a resilient ego deemed to be well adapted to its reality, and fully entitled 
to pursue its market-based right to happiness. As Binkley (2014) shows very clearly, this ego, as 
supposed apex of individualism and self-identity, is in fact fundamentally empty, a hollow, that offers 
little more than a plastic and malleable receptacle for the demands of today’s Other, the market. 
Secondly then, as well as exposing the genealogical origins of this hollow subject in the Neo-Freudian 
wave of ego-psychology, psychoanalysis helps us to focus on the persistence of the truly Freudian 
subject today, the divided subject who is made unhappy by the impossible demand to be happy in this 
new superegoic way. Thirdly then, some dialogue with clinical psychoanalysis allows critical happiness 
studies to push beyond the discourse of happiness and wellbeing in order to engage with their 
subjective effects, including the well-documented rise of what Lacanians call the ‘new symptoms’: 
depression, anxiety, addiction and eating disorders. For one of the most pernicious effects of the new 
discourse of happiness is its all-encompassing logic: indexing everyone somewhere on a continuum of 
happiness effectively eliminates the right to unhappiness, precisely as it enjoins individuals to be 
entrepreneurs of their own wellbeing. Accentuating the positive really does mean eliminating the 
negative. Clinical psychoanalysis, therefore, facilitates the attunement of critical happiness studies to 
the politics of the unhappy subject. Fourthly and finally, I believe that critical happiness studies stands 
to gain from an engagement with that tact with happiness I have discerned in Lacan’s 
recommendations for the ‘direction of the treatment’ (and in my own practice as an analyst): the 
signifier ‘critical’, with which this new field intends to distinguish itself, can perhaps move beyond 
ideology-critique and towards the transformative creativity of the analytic experience itself … without, 
of course, the promise happy endings. 
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